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According to Lynne Rudder Baker, our everyday world is populated, 
among other things, by what she calls intention-dependent objects (“ID 
objects”), i.e., objects whose existence depends on the propositional 
attitudes of intentional agents. ID objects, according to Baker, are ob-
jects that “could not exist in a world lacking beings with beliefs, desires, 
and intentions” (Baker, 2007, p. 11). ID objects instantiate intention- 
dependent properties (“ID properties”), i.e., “properties that cannot be 
instantiated in the absence of beings with beliefs, desires, and inten-
tions; and similarly, for ID events and ID phenomena more generally” 
(ibid.). In Baker’s view, it is impossible to make sense of the world, as 
we experience it, without taking on board the assumption that ID phe-
nomena exist. And not only are ID phenomena part of our ordinary 
experience of the world, according to Baker, they are also “ineliminable 
from the explanatory apparatus of many of the special sciences”—e.g., 
“economics, sociology, political science, epidemiology, traffic science, 
and the like” (Baker, 2007, p. 46). As part of Baker’s practical realist 
approach to metaphysics, she thus takes it to be “an obvious fact” that 
ID phenomena are real and that what exists, at least in part, depends on 
human activity:
A great deal of reality—though, of course, not all of it—depends on 
human activity. It does not follow that the only things that exist are 
the things that we have sortals for. There may well exist particles or 
biological natural kinds or future inventions that we have no sortals 
for. The claim that what there is depends on human activity is not 
‘incredible’, nor is it an ‘embarrassment’. It is an obvious fact.
(Baker, 2007, p. 47)1
Baker’s claim that what exists, at least in part, depends on human activ-
ity opens her up to the concern, or so her critics have argued, that new 
 1 In the quoted passage, Baker is referring to objections raised against her account by 
Theodore Sider (2001, p. 155).
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objects and new kinds of object can apparently be “conjured” into exis-
tence, given her framework, simply by adopting new ways of thinking or 
speaking about already existing things (cf. Koslicki, 2018, Chapter 8).2 
When Baker responds to a version of this objection launched against 
her account by Dean Zimmerman (2002), she proposes that we cannot 
simply think or speak things into existence for which “our conventions 
and practices do not have a place” (Baker, 2007, p. 44). In order for this 
response to be effective, however, we need to know more about how our 
conventions and practices support the creation of some ID objects and 
the kinds to which they belong, while disallowing the attempted creation 
of others. In this paper, I examine the effectiveness of Baker’s response 
in addressing the challenges posed by the inclusion of ID objects, such as 
artifacts, in Baker’s practical realist ontology.
1  The Apparent Interest-Relativity of Existence
Several of Baker’s critics over the years have wondered whether, in set-
ting out to characterize the world as we encounter and experience it, 
Baker does not in the end go too far in turning existence into a no-
tion that is dependent on human interests. Theodore Sider, for example, 
raises an objection of this sort in his review of Baker (2000):
Baker’s discussion of statues brings out one of the more implausible 
features of her ontology: what there is seems to depend on human 
interests. Everyone agrees humans can select certain objects from 
a pre-existing stock for their attention. For example, on the four- 
dimensional ontology I favor, a multitude of space-time worms exist 
regardless of human activity. Some fall under ordinary predicates: 
‘statue’, ‘lump’, ‘person’, ‘animal’, and so on. But consider odd pred-
icates we do not employ—for example, Eli Hirsch’s ‘in-car’, which 
applies only to sums of stages of cars that are contained within a 
garage. The four-dimensionalist regards these odd objects as just 
as real as statues and persons; humans simply ignore them. But for 
 2 In Koslicki (2018, Chapter 8), I discuss this objection with a focus specifically on Bak-
er’s author-intention-based account of artifact essences, as defended for example in 
Baker (2004, 2007). For other author-intention-based approaches to artifact essences, 
see, e.g., Evnine (2016) and Thomasson (2003, 2007); although Baker, Evnine, and 
Thomasson disagree on the details, all three nevertheless share the general outlook 
that what it is to be a certain artifact or artifact kind is, directly or indirectly, deter-
mined by what an artifact’s “original authors”, i.e., its creators, inventors, makers, 
producers, designers, etc., intended to make when they set out to realize their creative 
intentions. The worry just raised, however, concerning the apparent interest-relativity 
of Baker’s notion of existence, as it is understood for example by critics such as The-
odore Sider and Dean Zimmerman, is broader in scope and applies to ID phenomena 
more generally.
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Baker, reality includes only the statues and lumps. (If Baker admits 
incars, and further admits objects corresponding to all possible 
trans-temporal tracing concepts, it can be argued that this would 
amount to admitting temporal stages after all, which she resists.) 
It is tempting to conclude that she thinks we create the world, that 
these continuants exist because we have concepts for them. Or is it 
a cosmic accident that reality just happens to contain objects whose 
histories match our ordinary concepts for tracing?
(Sider, 2002, pp. 47–48)
Sider finds it difficult to believe (“a cosmic accident”?) that there would 
be such a surprisingly seamless match between the concepts we, as hu-
mans, employ to trace objects through space and time and what in fact 
exists. Given Sider’s own four-dimensionalist framework, he has the 
resources to assign the same ontological status to such apparent philo-
sophical inventions as Eli Hirsch’s “incars” (four-dimensional sums of 
stages consisting of cars while garaged) as he does to more commonly 
recognized entities, such as statues, animals, persons, and cars. Baker, in 
contrast, needs to be more selective and admit only the latter more com-
monly recognized entities, but not the former counterintuitive entities, 
into her three-dimensionalist ontology. This selectivity on Baker’s part 
raises suspicions in Sider’s mind that the apparently near-perfect corre-
spondence between our human concepts and what is said to fall under 
them is in fact engineered into Baker’s existence-concept to begin with 
by construing the latter notion in an interest-relative way. “It is tempt-
ing to conclude”, so Sider surmises, “that [Baker] thinks we create the 
world, that these continuants exist because we have concepts for them” 
(ibid., p. 48).
A similar objection is voiced by Dean Zimmerman, toward the end of 
his critical discussion of Baker (2000). Zimmerman focuses in particu-
lar on Baker’s conception of artifacts and is struck by the apparent ease 
with which new objects can be created, on Baker’s view, by means of a 
mere shift in the ways in which we think or talk about already existing 
things:
Baker thinks we sometimes bring things into existence by thinking 
about them—at least, this follows from her view if objects can be-
come artifacts (tools and works of art and monuments, for instance) 
simply by our thinking of them as such. A piece of conveniently 
shaped driftwood becomes a coffee table by being brushed off and 
brought into the house, a urinal becomes a sculpture when hung on 
a wall in a museum and given a title, a boulder becomes a bound-
ary marker or memorial when it is up-ended and used for either 
purpose. But do we really believe that anything new comes into ex-
istence when we do such things? One problem is that these acts are 
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on a spectrum with creative activities that seem really to result in 
something new; and that the idea of a sharp cutoff somewhere on 
the spectrum is both hard to believe in, yet necessary if we do not 
want to allow for things that only sort-of-exist—another difficult 
notion, for surely if there are such things, well, then there they are, 
existing after all!
(Zimmerman, 2002, pp. 333–334)
Why, so Zimmerman asks, should we follow Baker in believing that 
our thought and talk can succeed in creating new objects out of pre-
viously existing things in some cases but not in other cases to which 
they are otherwise so similar? Suppose, for example, that a shift in our 
verbal or nonverbal attitude can result in the creation of new objects 
from previously existing things in the sorts of case Zimmerman cites: 
conveniently shaped pieces of driftwood giving rise to coffee tables; a 
urinal being transformed into a sculpture; and a boulder serving as the 
basis for the creation of a boundary marker or memorial. Then, why 
does it strike us as counterintuitive in other cases to suppose that a new 
object is created from previously existing things as a result of a shift in 
our attitudes or behaviors? For example, we do not commonly suppose 
that a new object, the president of the United States, comes into exis-
tence when an individual human being begins to serve in a certain role 
(e.g., as commander- in-chief of the armed forces, etc.). If we did posit 
that the president of the United States is a distinct object that merely spa-
tiotemporally coincides with the human being who occupies this office, 
the object in question would have properties that would no doubt strike 
us as unusual and surprising: e.g., the president of the United States 
would have the ability to endure for hundreds of years and outlast each 
individual human office-holder; on certain occasions (e.g., during the 
inauguration), this object would have the ability to jump discontinuously 
in an instant from one place to another by several feet; and so forth. 
However, as Zimmerman notes, similar properties also seem to apply to 
objects in cases in which Baker might be less reluctant to admit that a 
shift in the ways in which we relate to previously existing things has the 
power to create new objects. For example, suppose Baker is willing to 
allow that there is such a thing as a train-line, e.g., the “Orange Blossom 
Special”, an object that is numerically distinct from but spatiotemporally 
coincident with certain train cars, engines, engineers, etc. Like the pres-
ident of the United States, the “Orange Blossom Special” also seems to 
have the ability to outlast the particular train cars, engines, engineers, 
etc., with which it coincides at each particular time at which the train-
line exists; or the ability to jump discontinuously in an instant from one 
set of tracks to another, all the while apparently persisting as the very 
same train-line; and so forth. If Baker is willing to accept such things 
as train-lines as part of her ontology, then why not also United States 
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presidents? Where and how, in the spectrum of cases Zimmerman dis-
cusses, does Baker draw the line between cases in which new objects are 
created and cases in which we merely come to talk, think, or otherwise 
behave differently toward already existing things? Zimmerman regards 
it as extremely unlikely that a systematic cut-off point could be found 
by which to distinguish cases of genuine creation from cases in which 
we merely adopt different verbal or nonverbal attitudes toward already 
existing things. If, however, no such principled dividing line is forthcom-
ing, then Zimmerman, like Sider, wonders whether Baker’s approach 
merely reflects the way in which our human minds represent the world, 
rather than yielding a genuinely realist metaphysics, as advertised.3
2  Baker’s Replies to her Critics
In Chapter 2 (“The Reality of Ordinary Things”) of The Metaphysics 
of Everyday Life, Baker replies to the concerns cited in the previous 
section (Baker, 2007, pp. 43–47).4 In her response, Baker distinguishes 
between several different types of case that, in her view, need to be 
treated differently. In the first type of case, an attempt is made to create 
a new object that (if the attempt is successful) would belong to an al-
ready recognized primary kind. In the second type of case, an attempt 
is made to create a new object that (if the attempt is successful) would 
result not just in a new member of an already existing kind but also 
in a completely new kind of object, i.e., an object whose primary kind 
had not previously been recognized in any fashion. In the third type of 
case, an attempt is made to create a new object that (if the attempt is 
successful) would belong to a kind that was previously recognized but 
not as a primary kind.
Baker conceives of the distinction between primary kinds and non- 
primary kinds as follows. For everything, x, that exists, in Baker’s view, 
we can ask the question, “What is x most fundamentally?”, and the an-
swer to this question will yield x’s primary kind (Baker, 2007, pp. 9–10). 
An entity’s primary kind is intimately tied to the entity’s persistence con-
ditions and both are essential to it. To illustrate, suppose x is both a per-
son and a teacher, but person, and not teacher, is x’s primary kind; then 
x is essentially a person but only contingently a teacher. Furthermore, 
if x’s primary kind is the kind person, then x is capable of surviving the 
 3 Insofar as Zimmerman’s objection raises questions concerning vagueness, the reader 
is referred to Baker (2007, Chapter 6) for a defense of the view that there is vagueness 
in reality, and not just in our semantic, conceptual, or epistemic ways of representing 
reality. For the purposes of the present discussion, however, we will leave questions 
concerning vagueness to one side.
 4 See also Baker (2002, pp. 47–49), for an earlier discussion of the criticisms raised in 
Sider (2002) and Zimmerman (2002).
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sorts of change through which persons can persist and x will cease to 
exist under the sorts of condition under which persons cease to exist.
It is a unique feature of Baker’s “Constitution View” that one and the 
same kind property, e.g., being a statue, need not be had essentially or 
nonderivatively by everything that has it at all, since the kind property 
in question need not be the primary kind property of all those objects 
that have it. For example, Michelangelo’s David is essentially or nonde-
rivatively a statue; being a statue is David’s primary kind property. But 
Piece, the numerically distinct piece of marble that is spatiotemporally 
coincident with David, is also a statue, on Baker’s view, but it is so only 
contingently or derivatively, viz., by virtue of being related to David 
in a particularly intimate fashion; being a statue is a kind property in-
stantiated by Piece, but Piece’s primary kind property is being a piece 
of marble and not being a statue. This kind of situation, in Baker’s 
view, is characteristic of the relationship objects bear to one another 
when one object (viz., Piece) constitutes another (viz., David). While 
some kind properties can play the dual role just noted (of being able 
to function both as primary kind properties for some objects, and as 
non-primary kind properties for other objects intimately related to the 
first), other kind properties (e.g., being a teacher) only ever function as 
non-primary kind properties for those objects that have them: nothing 
that is a teacher is a teacher essentially; and being a teacher does not 
determine the persistence conditions of those objects that instantiate 
this kind property.
2.1  Creating New Objects Belonging to Existing 
Primary Kinds
The examples brought up by Zimmerman in the passage cited above 
serve as illustrations of Baker’s first case. Suppose that an agent sets out 
to create a new object (e.g., a coffee table, sculpture, boundary marker, 
or memorial) from an already existing thing (e.g., a piece of driftwood, 
urinal, or boulder); and suppose further that the act of creation is suc-
cessful. In this case, the new object that is created would belong to an 
already recognized primary kind (viz., the primary kind, coffee table, 
sculpture, boundary marker, or memorial). Thus, while a successful act 
of creation in the first case adds a new entry to the inventory of already 
existing objects, the act in question does not lead to the expansion of our 
repertoire of previously recognized primary kind properties.
Even in this type of case, however, Baker insists that Zimmerman’s 
treatment leaves out some important considerations and, as a result, 
makes it seem as though the creation of new objects is an easier affair 
than it really turns out to be on Baker’s account. For even in a case in 
which a coffee table, say, is brought into existence from a conveniently 
shaped piece of driftwood, Baker notes that more is required than merely 
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that the piece of driftwood is “brushed off and brought into the house” 
(Zimmerman, 2002, p. 333), even when these actions (neither of which, 
of course, falls under the category of thought or talk) are combined with 
other changes in the verbal or nonverbal behaviors and attitudes held 
by certain agents who interact with the piece of driftwood in question. 
In addition, Baker points out, certain “table-favorable circumstances” 
must also obtain in order for a conveniently shaped piece of driftwood to 
give rise to a new object, a coffee table, with which it is spatiotemporally 
coincident but not identical. According to Baker’s usage, for any given 
primary kind property, G, the phrase “G-favorable circumstances” de-
notes the total background conditions that must be in place in order 
for something to have G; the presence of G-favorable circumstances is 
necessary, but not sufficient, for the instantiation of G by a suitable ob-
ject (cf. Baker, 1999, p. 149). In the kind of case before us, the “table- 
favorable circumstances”, in Baker’s view, would include, for example, 
practices and conventions governing our interactions with tables that 
are already in place; it is only in the context of such already established 
ways of engaging with objects of the kind in question that an agent is 
able to create a new member of the already existing primary kind, coffee 
table, by talking, thinking, and otherwise behaving differently toward 
a suitable thing that already exists, e.g., a conveniently shaped piece of 
driftwood. Although Baker allows that our thought and talk can in cer-
tain cases make an essential contribution to the creation of new objects 
from already existing things, these contributing factors by themselves 
are nevertheless not sufficient for the creation of a new member of an 
already existing kind; rather, they must work in conjunction with other 
conditions, e.g., established ways of interacting with objects of the kind 
in question, if an agent’s attempt at creating a new member of an exist-
ing primary kind is to be successful.
2.2 Creating New Objects Belonging to New Primary Kinds
The second type of case is meant to illustrate a more radical possibility: 
an act of creation that (if the act is successful) would not simply bring 
into existence a new member of an already existing kind, but rather re-
sult in the creation of a whole new primary kind. To illustrate this type 
of possibility, Baker imagines the following scenario:
… [O]ur practices and conventions, as well as our intentions, are 
what make one piece of driftwood constitute a table, and another 
piece of driftwood constitute a piece of art. If I saw a piece of drift-
wood and made up the word ‘bonangle’ on the spot, and thought 
to myself, ‘It would be nice if the world contained bonangles; I 
hereby make that piece of driftwood a bonangle’, I would not have 
brought into existence a new thing, a bonangle; our conventions and 
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practices do not have a place for bonangles. It is not just thinking 
that brings things into existence.
(Baker, 2007, pp. 43–44)
In this type of scenario, again contrary to what Zimmerman’s objections 
might have us believe, merely thinking or speaking in a new way about 
an already existing thing, e.g., a piece of driftwood, is not enough, on 
Baker’s account, to bring into existence a new kind of object, a bonan-
gle. Rather, as in the previous case, Baker crucially appeals to the role 
of our existing practices and conventions in underwriting the would-be 
creative powers of intentional agents and their verbal or nonverbal be-
havior. In this case, however, unlike the previous one, our established 
practices and conventions, in her view, do not support the imagined at-
tempt at creating a new kind of object, a bonangle, from an already 
existing thing, e.g., a piece of driftwood. Rather, the attempted act of 
creation in question misfires and neither a new object nor a new kind of 
object results from the supposed application of the newly invented word, 
“bonangle”, to an already existing thing.5
It is important to note in this connection that there is no general pro-
hibition, in Baker’s view, against the creation of new primary kind prop-
erties. Thus, the fact that we cannot create a novel type of object, a 
bonangle, by applying the new word, “bonangle”, to an already existing 
thing, e.g., a piece of driftwood, is not due to the fact that there are, as 
of yet, no established practices and conventions that govern specifically 
our interactions with bonangles. The adoption of such a principle would 
make it impossible ever to enlarge our existing pool of primary kind 
properties, e.g., by inventing a new kind of object or by otherwise add-
ing a previously unrecognized type of thing to those with which we are 
already familiar. But Baker explicitly acknowledges that our supply of 
primary kind properties must be taken to be open-ended and that, for 
this reason, no exhaustive list of what there is could ever be provided:
 5 Although Baker does not explicitly mention such worries here, we might also won-
der, given existing constraints governing word-creation, whether the creative failure 
illustrated in Baker’s imagined scenario affects not only the attempt to call into ex-
istence a new type of object, a bonangle, but also the attempt to create a new word, 
“bonangle”, by uttering a string of sounds and simply declaring it to be a new word, 
presumably one that (if the creative attempt is successful) now belongs to the En-
glish language. I will not in the present context investigate further what else might 
be required in order for intentional agents to succeed in adding new words to their 
language. However, Baker’s general response to Zimmerman’s objection may never-
theless apply to this case as well, assuming that, even in the case of words themselves, 
it is questionable whether a new member of an already existing primary kind can be 
established simply by uttering a certain string of sounds, accompanied by certain 
thoughts, intentions, and other propositional attitudes on the part of an individual 
speaker on a particular occasion. 
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Since a theory of primary kinds would be tantamount to a theory of 
everything, however, it is not surprising (although still regrettable) 
that I do not have one. And since we are constantly bringing into ex-
istence new kinds of things—from airliners to personal computers— 
there is no saying in advance exactly what the primary kinds will 
turn out to be.
(Baker, 2000, p. 41)
Thus, the deficiency in the imagined scenario does not turn on the fact 
that there are, as of yet, no established practices and conventions that 
govern our interactions specifically with bonangles. Rather, what Baker 
presumably has in mind is that some other shortcoming applies in this 
particular instance that prevents our established ways of interacting 
with other kinds of object from underwriting the imagined attempt at 
simultaneously creating both a new object and a new primary kind. We 
will return to the question of what this shortcoming might be in Section 
3.2 below. Whatever its exact nature, though, it is clear that Baker does 
not think the same deficiency afflicts all instances of the second type of 
case in which intentional agents attempt to create an entirely new kind 
of object from scratch: for there are, in Baker’s view, successful instances 
in which our existing practices and conventions do support the creation 
of an object belonging to a new primary kind (e.g., airliner or personal 
computer) that, prior to its creation, is also not yet governed by its own 
specific set of practices and conventions. As in the first type of case, 
however, Baker emphasizes that more is needed in order for a successful 
act of creation of the second type to get off the ground besides new ways 
of thinking or talking about already existing things; in both cases, the 
relevant background conditions must also already be in place in order 
for the creative act in question to be successful.
2.3  Creating New Objects by Transforming Non-Primary 
Kinds into Primary Kinds
To illustrate the third type of case, Baker takes up the challenge men-
tioned by Zimmerman and asks whether (and, if so, under what condi-
tions) a new object belonging to a new primary kind could be added to 
our existing inventory by transforming a previously recognized “mere” 
non-primary kind, e.g., president of the United States, into a primary 
kind. To illustrate, if it were possible for such a transformation to take 
place, then the event to which we now refer as “the assassination of John 
F. Kennedy” would have to be reconceptualized as follows: as a result of 
what happened on November 22, 1963, in Dallas, Texas, the very same 
United States president, who up until that point was known as “John F. 
Kennedy” continues to exist, but now under a new name, viz., “Lyndon 
B. Johnson”. Though the shots fired during the motorcade on that day 
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do affect the overall count of persons, the very same United States presi-
dent exists both at the beginning and at the end of the day, at first (until 
1:00 pm) spatiotemporally coincident with one person, John F. Kennedy, 
and subsequently (at 2:38 pm), after a short break, with a distinct per-
son, Lyndon B. Johnson.
What happens during the intervening period of time, which lasts one 
hour and thirty-eight minutes, between the events currently known as 
“John F. Kennedy’s death” at 1:00 pm and “Lyndon B. Johnson’s inau-
guration” at 2:38 pm? There are different options, depending on what 
sorts of object United States presidents turn out to be, under the new 
rules, and how exactly they persist through time. According to one op-
tion, such objects have the ability to exist in a “gappy” or intermittent 
fashion: given this option, the very same United States president goes 
out of existence on November 22, 1963 at 1:00 pm and then comes back 
into existence a short while later on the same day at 2:38 pm. Given this 
conception, United States presidents might be thought of as, in some re-
spects, similar to artifacts (e.g., trumpets, bicycles, or watches) that can 
be disassembled and then reassembled, assuming that the very same ar-
tifact ceases to exist, when disassembled, and comes back into existence, 
when reassembled. Alternatively, United States presidents might be able 
to take on different “modes” of existence, depending on whether a per-
son is or is not spatiotemporally coincident with them: given this option, 
the very same United States president goes from being, so to speak, “per-
sonified” to being “non-personified” and back again, without ceasing to 
exist. Given this second option, United States presidents might be com-
pared to human souls, on a Thomistic conception, according to which 
they can switch, between death and resurrection, from existing in an 
“embodied” state to existing in a “disembodied” state and back again, 
without ceasing to exist. Either way, the persistence conditions govern-
ing objects that are fundamentally, i.e., essentially and nonderivatively, 
United States presidents and only contingently or derivatively persons 
diverge quite dramatically from those governing objects that are funda-
mentally, i.e., essentially and nonderivatively, persons, but only contin-
gently or derivatively United States presidents.
Is it possible and, if so, what sorts of change would have to take place, 
Baker asks, in order to bring about a transformation like that just imag-
ined in which the kind, president of the United States, goes from being 
a non-primary kind to being a primary kind? In true pragmatist fash-
ion, Baker cannot rule out with absolute certainty that such a trans-
formation would ever occur; she does, however, regard it as extremely 
unlikely for the following reasons (cf. Baker, 2007, p. 45). First, Baker 
observes, in other cases in which a new primary kind (e.g., printing press 
or passport) is brought into existence as a result of actions taken by 
intentional agents, we notice that the creative acts in question do not fol-
low the pattern envisioned in the third type of case in which an existing 
124 Kathrin Koslicki
non-primary kind is allegedly transformed into a primary kind. Rather, 
in these instances, a new primary kind is created from scratch (i.e., as 
outlined in the second type of case) without having previously existed as 
a non-primary kind. Furthermore, in order for president of the United 
States to go from being a non-primary to being a primary kind, cor-
responding changes would have to take place in our established ways 
of relating to the United States presidency, in order for the imagined 
transition to come about. And while perhaps not outright impossible, so 
Baker argues, we nevertheless have no reason to expect, given the kinds 
of creatures we are, that the practices and conventions in which the insti-
tution of the United States presidency is currently embedded would ever 
evolve in such a way as to accommodate the transformation in question. 
Elaborating on this second point, Baker remarks as follows:
In the second place, it is difficult to imagine any human interest 
that would lead to conventions making president a primary kind. 
Our conventions are based on our interests, and I cannot imagine 
any human interest that would lead to conventions that would make 
president to be a primary kind. We choose what interests to have 
only within a limited range. We cannot just change our interests at 
will. I don’t think that we could just decide to change our general 
interest in having shelter, or in being treated with dignity. I agree 
with the evolutionary psychologists to this extent: Our interests are 
not wholly malleable. So, I doubt that we could come to regard pres-
ident as a primary kind. In that case, no change in the way that we 
talk would bring it about that president is a primary kind.
(Baker, 2007, p. 45)
In Baker’s view, the practices and conventions governing our ways of 
interacting with objects are in some way determined by human inter-
ests. And while our interests allow for some degree of malleability in 
how we engage with the world around us, there are nevertheless limits 
to our ability to modify our established ways of interacting with ob-
jects or adopt a different set of practices and conventions from those 
that are already in place. Given this picture, then, Baker regards it 
as unrealistic to suppose that our existing practices and conventions 
would change in a way required by the imagined transformation of the 
kind, president of the United States, from being a non-primary kind to 
being a primary kind.
In sum, with respect to all three types of cases just considered, Baker 
takes herself to have shown that, despite Zimmerman’s charges to the 
contrary, her approach yields the right results after all. Whether agents 
attempt to create new objects belonging to existing primary kinds (as 
in the first case) or new primary kinds (as in the second and third case), 
more is required, on Baker’s account, for an attempted act of creation to 
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be successful than a mere shift in the way in which we talk or think about 
existing things. When Zimmerman speaks of “a powerful resistance to 
the idea that changes in our ways of talking about things, even coupled 
with simple changes in some of our nonverbal reactions to things, could 
by themselves bring any concrete physical object into existence” (Zim-
merman, 2002, p. 335), Baker counters that
… [A]lthough I do hold that thought and talk make an essential 
contribution to the existence of certain objects, I do not hold that 
thought and talk alone bring into existence any physical objects: 
conventions, practices, and preexisting materials are also required. 
So, on my view, what brings concrete things into existence is not just 
‘ways of talking about things, even coupled with simple changes in 
some of our nonverbal reactions to things’. I do not think that we 
just conjure up new concrete physical objects of an afternoon.
(Baker, 2007, p. 46)
As Baker notes here, the creation of new concrete physical objects by 
intentional agents requires the presence of at least the following three 
conditions: (i) suitable preexisting materials; (ii) the contributions of in-
tentional agents (e.g., new ways of talking, thinking, or otherwise inter-
acting with existing things); and (iii) practices and conventions providing 
the needed background support for an intentional agent’s creative act. 
It is only when all three of these factors act in concert that intentional 
agents can succeed in creating new concrete physical objects belonging 
to an existing or a new primary kind.6
3  Baker’s Appeal to Practices and Conventions
Baker’s defense against her critics relies heavily on the role of practices 
and conventions in underwriting efforts by intentional agents to expand 
our existing repertoire of objects and the primary kinds to which they 
belong. In this section, we examine in more detail how Baker’s appeal 
to established ways of interacting with objects is intended to diffuse the 
charge of antirealism mounted against her approach by commentators 
such as Sider and Zimmerman. Our discussion will again proceed by 
considering each of the three cases described in Section 2 separately.7
 6 As noted here, when discussing the possible creation of new objects or new primary 
kinds by intentional agents, Baker and her critics have in mind specifically concrete 
physical objects and the primary kinds to which they belong. For the sake of sim-
plicity, when I speak of “objects”, in what follows, I can be taken to mean “concrete 
physical objects”, unless otherwise noted.
 7 When Baker appeals to the role of practices and conventions in underwriting attempts 
by intentional agents to create new objects or new primary kinds, she does not further 
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3.1 Artifact Creation
How, in Baker’s view, do our existing practices and conventions under-
write and constrain attempts by intentional agents to create new objects 
belonging to already recognized primary kinds? Since many of the il-
lustrations used above concern artifacts, we will respond to the ques-
tion just posed by (briefly) consulting Baker’s understanding of what it 
takes for an artifact to come into existence (see Baker, 2004 & Baker, 
2007, Chapter 3). Baker’s theory of artifacts is primarily directed to-
ward what she calls “technical artifacts”, a subclass of artifacts that 
are “the material products of our endeavors to attain practical goals”: 
technical artifacts, in Baker’s view, are “intentionally made to serve a 
given purpose” (Baker, 2007, p. 49). It is part of the essence of technical 
artifacts, i.e., entailed by the primary kind to which they belong, that 
they have intended proper functions, i.e., “proper functions that they 
are (intentionally) designed and produced to perform (whether they per-
form their proper functions or not)” (Baker, 2007, p. 51). The notion of 
an intended proper function introduces normativity into the mix, which 
in turn makes room for the possibility of malfunction, i.e., the idea that 
a technical artifact may be unable to perform the intended proper func-
tion it is supposed to carry out (ibid.).8
To illustrate Baker’s conception of artifact creation, let us consider (as 
Baker does) the example of a boat (“Boat”) that, once it comes into ex-
istence, is constituted by an aggregate (“Agg”) of planks and nails.9 The 
elaborate on how we are to think of practices and conventions in this context. Ac-
cording to David Lewis’ classic Humean account (Lewis, 1969), social conventions 
are regularities (i.e., systems of intentions, preferences, and expectations) character-
izing agents who find themselves confronted by a coordination problem of some sort 
(i.e., a situation in which there is more than one mutually beneficial way for agents 
to coordinate their actions). But not everyone agrees that social conventions should 
be understood in the Lewisian way (see, for example, Marmor, 2009; Gilbert, 1989). 
A helpful survey of the literature on convention can be found in Rescorla (2019). 
The nature of practices in general is discussed, for example, in Theodore Schatzki’s 
“Introduction” in Schatzki, Knorr Cetina, and von Savigny (2001). For the purposes 
at hand, I assume that Baker regards a practice as something more elaborate than an 
individual action that is performed by an individual agent on a particular occasion. 
Rather, Baker seems to view practices as ways of organizing individual actions into 
systems of some sort that are governed by corresponding sets of conventions. Section 
3.1 considers in more detail how Baker envisions processes of artifact creation as 
practices governed by corresponding sets of conventions.
 8 In what follows, I will refer to technical artifacts simply as “artifacts”.
 9 Aggregates, according to Baker, are just mereological sums, as they are conceived 
of by standard or classical extensional merelogy; that is, the existence and identity 
of an aggregate turns on nothing more than the existence and identity of the objects 
composing it. An aggregate that consists, for example, of planks and nails belongs to 
a “hybrid” primary kind, plank/nail, “by courtesy”, i.e., by virtue of the fact that it 
is composed of objects that belong to the primary kinds, plank and nail. In order for 
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process of constructing Boat from Agg is governed by four conditions 
that Baker takes to be necessary and sufficient for something’s being an 
artifact (modified here to fit the particular case under consideration): (1) 
Boat is constructed by one or more builders (including designers, exec-
utors of design, or others who are involved with Boat’s construction); 
(2) Boat’s primary kind, boat, is determined in part by the intentions of 
its builders; (3) Boat’s existence depends on the intentions of its builders 
and the execution of these intentions; and (4) Boat is constituted by Agg, 
an aggregate the builders have arranged or selected to serve the proper 
function entailed by Boat’s primary kind, viz., to enable aquatic trans-
portation. In order to serve the purpose at hand, Agg must be “appro-
priate”, i.e., suitable for the construction of an artifact, viz., Boat, whose 
intended proper function is to enable aquatic transportation.10 In addi-
tion, Baker’s definition of “constitution” requires, among other things, 
that, in order for Agg to constitute Boat, Agg must be in “boat-favorable 
conditions” (cf. Section 3.1 above):
The boat-favorable circumstances concern the relations between 
an appropriate aggregate for boats, designers and/or builders. For 
example: (a) the aggregate must be in the presence of one or more 
persons who know how to build a boat from the items in the ag-
gregate, and who either intend to build a boat from the items in the 
aggregate or whose activity is directed by someone who intends to 
have a boat built from the items in the aggregate; (b) the items in the 
aggregate must be manipulated by such persons (either manually or 
by machine) in ways that execute their productive intentions or of 
those directing the persons; (c) the result of the manipulation must 
satisfy the productive intentions of the persons.
(Baker, 2007, p. 54)
As Baker notes in this passage, the “boat-favorable circumstances” that 
must be in place in order to underwrite Boat’s construction from Agg 
an aggregate to belong to the hybrid primary kind, plank/nail, the x’s composing the 
aggregate must either belong to the primary kind, plank, or the primary kind, nail 
(Baker, 2007, p. 50). Since all it takes for Agg to exist is for the planks and nails com-
posing Agg to exist, Agg already exists prior to Boat’s construction; and assuming 
that no planks or nails cease to exist during the process of constructing Boat, Agg 
will continue to exist after Boat’s creation, at which point Agg comes to constitute 
Boat, provided that the conditions contained in Baker’s definition of “constitution” 
are satisfied by the relation that obtains between Boat and Agg.
 10 For a general formulation of (A1)–(A4), the four conditions Baker takes to be neces-
sary and sufficient for something’s being an artifact, as well as a more detailed state-
ment of the two conditions, (i) and (ii), for the “appropriateness” of an aggregate for 
the purpose of constituting an artifact with a certain intended proper function, see 
Baker (2007, pp. 52–53).
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include requirements concerning the know-how as well as the skillful 
execution of the relevant sorts of productive intention on the part of 
the builders or others involved in the process of constructing Boat from 
Agg. And although Baker does not explicitly say so here, we can safely 
assume that the requirements she cites in (a)–(c) are exactly what she 
has in mind when she speaks elsewhere of “practices and conventions” 
as providing the needed background support for the successful creation 
of objects by intentional agents. In this case, presumably, the relevant 
practice is that of boat construction and the conventions in question 
are those governing the practice of boat construction. The process of 
constructing Boat from Agg thus fits Baker’s three conditions, outlined 
above (cf. Section 2.3), according to which the successful creation of 
ID objects must proceed (i) from preexisting materials; (ii) by way of 
the contributions of intentional agents; (iii) with the right background 
support provided by existing practices and conventions. For, first, Boat’s 
construction proceeds from Agg, an “appropriate” aggregate consisting 
of preexisting materials that are suitable for the purpose at hand, viz., 
the construction of Boat, an artifact whose intended proper function is 
to enable aquatic transportation. Second, Boat’s construction from Agg 
proceeds by way of contributions from intentional agents, viz., the build-
ers, designers, and others involved with the construction of Boat from 
Agg, who skillfully manipulate these preexisting materials and execute 
their know-how for the purposes of realizing their productive intentions. 
And, third, Boat’s construction from Agg takes place within the context 
of the existing practice of boat construction as well as the conventions 
governing this practice, which help to determine what sorts of skill and 
know-how are expected from agents who wish to participate in the prac-
tice in question by realizing their productive intentions to build a boat 
from suitable preexisting materials.11
This illustration of how the construction of Boat from Agg is embed-
ded within the established practice of boat construction and the con-
ventions governing it certainly helps to bring home the point that the 
 11 Once Boat has come into existence, then a different set of practices and conventions 
takes over from those governing boat construction; for, at that point, the task at 
hand is no longer that of creating a new artifact with the intended proper function 
of aquatic transportation from preexisting materials. Rather, once the productive in-
tention to build Boat from Agg has been successfully executed, the relevant practices 
and conventions governing an intentional agent’s interaction with Boat concern the 
competent use of an artifact whose intended proper function is aquatic transporta-
tion. The relevant intentional agents interacting with Boat are then no longer builders, 
designers, etc., but rather those who competently operate, maintain, and use Boat for 
its intended purpose, in circumstances that are compatible with its intended purpose. 
For further elucidation, see Baker’s remarks on how to demarcate genuine cases of 
malfunction from other circumstances in which artifacts fail to perform their in-
tended proper functions, in Baker (2007, pp. 55–58) and Baker (2009).
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creation of new objects belonging to existing primary kinds, at least in 
some cases, can be quite a demanding affair, given Baker’s requirements. 
For, under normal circumstances, a new artifact that can be trusted to 
transport people and goods safely across bodies of water cannot be cre-
ated merely by uttering certain words or thinking certain thoughts about 
preexisting things, such as planks, nails, and whatever else is involved 
in the construction of a boat. At the same time, though, a case like that 
before us involving Boat’s construction from Agg will not ultimately put 
to rest concerns voiced by critics such as Sider and Zimmerman, who 
worry that, deep down, the notion of existence employed by Baker’s ac-
count is nevertheless objectionably interest-relative. For Baker’s appeal, 
in this case, to established practices and conventions of course presup-
poses that we have already come to terms with the inclusion of boats, 
planks, nails, and other apparently intention-dependent objects in our 
ontology; and the same will be true of any other instance of the first 
type of case in which a new object belonging to an already recognized 
primary kind comes into existence as result of an intentional agent’s 
creative act. It is thus vital to turn to the second and third type of case 
involving the alleged creation of new kinds of object to see whether Bak-
er’s reliance on practices and conventions, in cases in which the existence 
of the primary kind in question is not already presupposed, can help 
firm up the boundary between successful and unsuccessful attempts by 
intentional agents to realize their productive intentions.
3.2 Primary Kind Creation
In Section 2.2, we discussed a failed instance of the second type of case 
in which an intentional agent simultaneously attempts to create a new 
object, a bonangle, and a new primary kind, bonangle, by applying the 
newly invented word, “bonangle”, to an already existing thing, a piece of 
driftwood. In this instance, Baker regards the attempted act of creation 
as unsuccessful, since “our conventions and practices do not have a place 
for bonangles” (Baker, 2007, p. 44). Although the bonangle-scenario 
seems to meet the first and second condition Baker places on successful 
attempts by intentional agents to create new objects, the third condition 
in this case is not satisfied: the attempted creation of a bonangle, or so 
we may assume, proceeds (i) from suitable preexisting materials, viz., 
a piece of driftwood;12 and (ii) with the contribution of an intentional 
 12 Whether pieces of driftwood are indeed “suitable” for the creation of bonangles (if 
they were to exist) is difficult to say, since bonangles do not in fact exist and we have, 
as I am about to suggest, very little information as to what sorts of thing bonangles 
would be, if they existed. However, since Baker’s emphasis is on the lack of support 
from existing practices and conventions, rather than on the inadequacy of pieces of 
driftwood for the purposes of constituting bonangles, I am assuming that the scenario 
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agent, who applies the new word, “bonangle”, to the piece of driftwood; 
but (iii) our existing practices and conventions do not provide the needed 
background support to underwrite the attempted creation of a new pri-
mary kind.13
Why is it that the introduction of a new primary kind, bonangle, is 
not supported by our existing practices and conventions? It is not en-
tirely clear how, given Baker’s views, this question ought to be answered, 
since the imagined scenario, as it stands, is quite under-described and 
we therefore do not have much to go on in our attempt to understand 
what a bonangle would be, if one of them had come into existence, and 
why our existing practices and conventions might block an intentional 
agent’s attempt to create such entities. We can at least gather from what 
Baker does say, however, that, if the imagined creative act had been suc-
cessful, the bonangle that would have come into existence would have 
been, first, a concrete physical object and, second, an ID object. For, 
first, if the attempted act of creation in question had been successful, the 
newly created bonangle would have been constituted by (and hence nu-
merically distinct from but spatiotemporally coincident with) a piece of 
driftwood. And, second, since the act of applying the word “bonangle” 
to the piece of driftwood seems to play a crucial role in the attempted 
creation of a bonangle, we can assume that the bonangle that would 
have come into existence (had the creative act been successful) would 
have been an ID object, i.e., an object that “could not exist in a world 
lacking beings with beliefs, desires, and intentions” (Baker, 2007, p. 11). 
At least this much is certainly suggested by Baker’s remarks; whether 
it is safe to generalize from this case, however, and assume that any 
bonangle (were bonangles to exist) would be both a concrete physical 
object and an ID object is not, as it stands, settled by Baker’s specifi-
cation of the imagined scenario. For, based on her remarks, we do not 
know whether bonangles (were they to exist) must be constituted by ag-
gregates of concrete physical objects and, if so, whether such aggregates 
must be pieces of driftwood or whether the reference to pieces of drift-
wood in Baker’s scenario is merely optional, and not mandatory. Nor 
do we know whether bonangles (were they to exist) could be created in 
other ways, without calling a preexisting thing “a bonangle”, and pos-
sibly even without any contribution from intentional agents at all. In a 
similar vein, many other important questions concerning bonangles are 
left open by Baker’s remarks, e.g., whether bonangles (were they to ex-
ist) would be artifacts, i.e., whether, as part of their essence, they would 
in question is set up to illustrate a failure of the third condition, even while the first 
and second conditions are satisfied. 
 13 For helpful discussion of Baker’s bonangle-scenario, see also Evnine (2016, especially 
pp. 110–118). Baker’s metaphysical framework more generally is discussed in Evnine 
(2011) and Evnine (2016, pp. 42–50).
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have an intended proper function and, if so, what this intended proper 
function might be, and so forth.
Given the many gaps in our understanding of what bonangles would 
be, were they to exist, it is certainly natural to entertain the thought 
that our established practices and conventions block the attempted cre-
ation of bonangles, at least in part, because of the lack of specificity in 
the characterization of what sorts of thing bonangles would be, were 
they to exist. For we might plausibly expect our existing practices and 
conventions to place at least minimal specificity requirements on any 
presumed act of creation by an intentional agent, so that it can be evalu-
ated, on any particular occasion, whether or not the agent’s creative in-
tention had been successfully realized. Judging from Baker’s reaction to 
the imagined scenario, however, her dissatisfaction with the bonangle- 
scenario does not seem to revolve around the lack of specificity in the 
characterization of what bonangles would be, if they existed. (After all, 
since the scenario in question is a figment of Baker’s own imagination, 
we might, in that case, have expected her simply to supply the missing 
information, if in fact the main culprit for the failed attempt to create a 
new primary kind was the failure to characterize with a sufficient degree 
of specificity what exactly was supposed to have come into existence.) 
Instead, Baker seems to think that, as it stands, we know enough about 
bonangles to conclude that the attempted creation of the new primary 
kind, bonangle, as described, misfires, not because of the lack of speci-
ficity in the characterization of what bonangles would be, if they existed, 
but for some other reason.
For the purposes at hand, let us therefore bracket questions concern-
ing the lack of specificity in the bonangle-scenario and ask instead what 
Baker’s reasons might be for holding that, given what we do know about 
bonangles, our existing practices and conventions do not support their 
attempted creation. In this connection, it would of course be helpful, 
once again, to be able to consult a theory of primary kinds, since such 
a theory would yield answers to questions of the form, “Under what 
conditions does one thing come to constitute a new entity as opposed 
to simply gaining a property?” (Baker, 2000, p. 41). And while, as we 
already noted in our earlier discussion (Section 2.2), Baker regrets not 
being in a position to supply such a theory of primary kinds, she does 
propose a characteristic by means of which to distinguish genuine cases 
of constitution from mere cases of property acquisition:
In the absence of a theory of primary kinds, let me suggest a con-
sideration that would lead us to say whether a case is one of consti-
tution or of mere property acquisition. If x constitutes y, then y has 
whole classes of causal properties that x would not have had if x 
had not constituted anything. The anvil acquires the property of be-
ing a doorstop by our enlisting a physical property of the anvil—its 
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heaviness—for a special purpose: to hold open the barn door. The 
use of the anvil as a doorstop does not bring about instantiation of 
whole classes of properties that anvils per se do not have. On the 
other hand, David has many causal properties of different kinds 
that Piece would not have had if Piece had not constituted anything. 
And you and I have uncountably many causal properties that our 
bodies would not have had if they had not constituted anything—
from looking forward to graduation, to reminding a friend to return 
a book, to serving on a jury, and on and on. So, even without a the-
ory of primary kinds, we have some clear cases of constitution, and 
we have a characteristic—the constituted thing has different kinds 
of causal properties than the constituting thing would have had if 
it had not constituted anything—that marks off constitution from 
mere property acquisition.
(Baker, 2000, p. 41)
The crucial idea behind the characteristic Baker proposes here centers 
on the connection between constitution and the instantiation of whole 
classes of causal properties by the constituted thing that the constituting 
thing per se would not instantiate, if it did not constitute anything.14 To 
illustrate, let us consider a case of constitution, e.g., Piece’s constituting 
David. In this case, according to Baker, the constituted thing, viz., Da-
vid, instantiates whole classes of causal properties (e.g., properties such 
as causing admiration in museum-goers, fetching a high price at an art 
auction, etc.) that Piece would not instantiate, if it did not constitute 
anything. These causal properties instantiated by David, moreover, are 
not properties that pieces of marble per se instantiate, unless they con-
stitute something that belongs to a primary kind (e.g., statue) distinct 
from their own (viz., piece of marble). In contrast, consider a case of 
mere property acquisition, e.g., an anvil’s being used as a doorstop. In 
this case, Baker wants to say that the anvil acquires a new property (viz., 
 14 Here it is important to remember that, according to Baker’s “Constitution View”, 
objects that stand in the constitution-relation (e.g., Piece and David) can “borrow” 
or “inherit” properties from each other (Section 2). Thus, while Piece constitutes 
David, for example, Piece also instantiates the kind property, being a statue, though 
it does so only contingently and derivatively, viz., by virtue of constituting an object 
(viz., David) that instantiates this property as its primary kind property, i.e., essen-
tially and nonderivatively. The same sort of property inheritance also applies to other 
types of property (e.g., the property of causing admiration in museum-goers), which 
Piece may similarly “borrow” from David, while Piece constitutes David. Property 
inheritance, moreover, is a two-way street: that is, not only is Piece able to “borrow” 
properties from David but David may similarly instantiate properties derivatively 
(e.g., the property of being heavy), by virtue of being constituted by an object (viz., 
Piece) that instantiates these properties nonderivatively. (See Baker, 1999 for further 
discussion of bottom-up and top-down property inheritance.) 
The Threat of Speaking or Thinking Things 133
being used as a doorstop), but it does so by enlisting properties the anvil 
already has to begin with (e.g., its heaviness). Furthermore, the anvil’s 
acquisition of this new property, being used as a doorstop, does not 
bring about the anvil’s instantiation of whole classes of causal properties 
that anvils per se do not instantiate.15
Applying this test to the bonangle-scenario, we may now conjecture 
that a case in which an intentional agent applies the newly invented 
word, “bonangle”, to a piece of driftwood, in Baker’s view, should be 
classified as a case of mere property acquisition, rather than as a case 
of constitution. For while the piece of driftwood does acquire a new 
property (viz., the property of being called “a bonangle”), the instantia-
tion of this new property by the piece of driftwood proceeds by way of 
harnessing properties the piece of driftwood already has to begin with 
(e.g., in this case, perhaps nothing more than its salience to the speaker 
in the imagined scenario). Furthermore, the instantiation of this new 
property by the piece of driftwood does not by itself bring with it the in-
stantiation of whole classes of causal properties that pieces of driftwood 
per se do not instantiate, without constituting something that belongs 
to a primary kind distinct from their own (viz., piece of driftwood). In 
contrast, if it were the case that, in addition to acquiring the new prop-
erty of having been labeled “a bonangle”, the piece of driftwood also 
simultaneously acquires whole classes of causal properties that pieces 
of driftwood per se do not instantiate, then Baker would presumably 
regard the recognition of a new primary kind, bonangle, as justified. 
In that case, it is reasonable to expect that our existing practices and 
conventions, in Baker’s view, would no longer block, but rather support, 
the recognition of objects belonging to the new primary kind, bonangle, 
since these objects now deserve to be assigned a place in our conceptual 
schemes as the bearers of whole classes of causal properties. In fact, al-
though Baker does not explicitly say so, we might further surmise that, 
if bonangles were associated with whole classes of causal properties, 
then our existing (bonangle-free) practices and conventions would be 
under pressure to evolve in such a way as to give rise to new practices 
and conventions that govern our interactions with bonangles, just as the 
invention of the printing press, for example, brought in its wake a whole 
slew of new practices and conventions surrounding our engagement with 
printed materials.
 15 In Baker (2007, Chapter 11) and Baker (2015), the idea that constitution leads to the 
instantiation of whole classes of causal properties is furthermore linked up in interest-
ing ways with other phenomena that are themselves well worth investigating, such as 
“ontological significance”, “ontological novelty”, “ontological levels”, “emergence”, 
and “irreducibility”. A discussion of these additional repercussions of Baker’s pro-
posal, however, would lead us too far afield for present purposes. 
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3.3 Non-Primary to Primary Kind Transformation
The final missing piece in our discussion of Baker’s response to Zim-
merman’s objections is to apply Baker’s proposed characteristic distin-
guishing cases of constitution from mere cases of property acquisition 
to the third type of case cited above (Section 2.3). In this case, we are 
presented with a scenario envisioning the transformation of a currently 
recognized non-primary kind, e.g., president of the United States, into 
a primary kind. As in the bonangle-scenario, Baker reaches a negative 
verdict and argues that, while perhaps not outright impossible, it is nev-
ertheless extremely unlikely that our existing practices and conventions 
would evolve in such a way as to accommodate the imagined transfor-
mation of the kind, president of the United States, into a primary kind. 
Practices and conventions, Baker argues, are ultimately determined by 
human interests and, so she reasons, it is difficult to imagine that our 
interests surrounding the United States presidency would change in such 
a way as to require the recognition of objects that are fundamentally, 
i.e., essentially and nonderivatively, United States presidents and only 
contingently and derivatively persons (cf. Baker, 2007, p. 45).
According to Baker’s proposed characteristic, cases of constitution 
differ from mere cases of property acquisition by whether an object 
comes to instantiate whole classes of causal properties that objects be-
longing to the primary kind in question do not instantiate per se, i.e., 
without constituting something belonging to a distinct primary kind. 
Applying this test to the current scenario, then, we would expect that a 
case in which a person, e.g., John F. Kennedy, acquires the new property, 
being president of the United States, is classified by Baker’s criterion as 
a case of mere property acquisition, rather than constitution. And this 
prediction does in fact seem to be borne out. No doubt, John F. Kennedy, 
upon being inaugurated as the 35th president of the United States, also 
acquires many other causal properties, in addition to his taking over 
the United States presidency (e.g., such properties as being commander- 
in-chief of the United States military, exercising veto power over leg-
islation passed by the United States congress, appointing judges to the 
Supreme Court, and so on). However, or so we would expect Baker to 
reason, these causal properties belong to property-classes (e.g., the class 
of legal or political properties, etc.) that persons per se can instantiate 
without constituting something belonging to a primary kind distinct 
from their own. For example, a person who has acquired the property of 
being a judge instantiates causal legal properties (e.g., such properties as 
sentencing a defendant); and a person who has acquired the property of 
being a United States citizen instantiates causal political properties (e.g., 
such properties as voting in an election). That persons per se can in fact 
instantiate causal properties belonging to these property-classes is of 
course something that cannot be simply asserted but needs to be backed 
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up by further arguments. For the purposes of this discussion, however, 
we can reasonably grant Baker that she has provided such argument in 
developing a conception of persons as precisely the kinds of being who 
are capable of instantiating such causal properties without constituting 
anything that belongs to a distinct primary kind (see, e.g., Baker, 2000).
Conclusion
Over the years, Lynne Rudder Baker’s practical realist framework has 
come under fire from critics such as Theodore Sider and Dean Zimmer-
man, who have wondered whether her approach in fact yields a genu-
inely realist metaphysics, as advertised, or merely a reflection of how 
our human minds represent the world. Sider, for example, suspects that 
it is really us, on Baker’s approach, who create the world, that “continu-
ants exist because we have concepts for them” (Sider, 2002, p. 48). And 
Zimmerman worries, in a similar vein, that, given Baker’s conception 
of artifacts, it is simply too easy for intentional agents to bring new 
objects or new kinds of object into existence, merely by adopting new 
ways of thinking or speaking about existing things (Zimmerman, 2002, 
pp. 333–334). In her response to these objections, Baker relies crucially 
on the role of practices and conventions in supporting, or blocking, at-
tempts by intentional agents to create new objects or new kinds of ob-
ject. Intentional agents, in Baker’s view, do have the capacity to expand 
our existing inventory of objects and primary kinds, and the resulting 
intention-dependent phenomena, she argues, should be accepted as in-
eliminably real. At the same time, however, as the foregoing remarks 
have brought out, Baker also imposes important constraints on the cir-
cumstances, and ways, in which intentional agents can bring new ob-
jects and new primary kinds into existence, not least by way of building 
into her account a sensitivity to the presence of causal properties that are 
revealed through our actual encounters with the world. As Baker writes 
in response to Sider’s objection:
There need be no miracle. Reality doesn’t ‘just happen to match our 
conceptual scheme’. Our ‘conceptual scheme’ is a product of our 
interactions in the world. We have the conceptual scheme that we 
have because of our actual encounters.
(Baker, 2007, p. 46)
Even though some components of our conceptual scheme are them-
selves the products of our own creation, the human interests motivating 
these creative activities are themselves “not wholly malleable”, in Bak-
er’s view: for “[w]e choose what interests to have only within a limited 
range” (Baker, 2007, p. 45).
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